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Abstract
Abnormalities in social interaction are a common feature of several psychiatric disorders, aligning with the recent move
towards using Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) to describe disorders in terms of observable behaviours rather than using
specific diagnoses. Neuroeconomic games are an effective measure of social decision-making that can be adapted for use in
neuroimaging, allowing investigation of the biological basis for behaviour. This review summarises findings of
neuroeconomic gameplay studies in Axis 1 psychiatric disorders and advocates the use of these games as measures of the
RDoC Affiliation and Attachment, Reward Responsiveness, Reward Learning and Reward Valuation constructs. Although
research on neuroeconomic gameplay is in its infancy, consistencies have been observed across disorders, particularly in
terms of impaired integration of social and cognitive information, avoidance of negative social interactions and reduced
reward sensitivity, as well as a reduction in activity in brain regions associated with processing and responding to social
information.
Introduction
Psychiatric disorders are prevalent and often debilitating con-
ditions for which the underlying biological causes or con-
tributing factors are largely unknown. Research progress has
been limited by a lack of measurable biomarkers to distinguish
categories of disorders, relying instead upon self-report criteria.
Here, we review how differences in social and cognitive pro-
cessing measured through neuroeconomic gameplay may offer
one useful approach towards the ambitions of the Research
Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative, proposed by the National
Institute of Mental Health (USA), which advocates such a
biomarker approach [1]. As we will describe, these are a set of
easily applied games that show both shared and differential
behavioural and brain responses across conventional diagnostic
boundaries.
Social interaction is an intrinsic feature of human behaviour
and any disruption to the ability to understand or act upon
social information can have a serious impact on everyday life.
Making decisions in social situations is a complicated process
that requires substantial cognitive capacity as well as awareness
of the context of the decision, inference of others’ emotion
(theory of mind (ToM)), understanding the motivations for
others’ actions and consideration of the potential consequences
of decisions for both parties. At a neuronal level, these pro-
cesses require rapid integration of complex information across
a network of brain regions. It is therefore not surprising that
social cognition is impaired in many, if not all psychiatric
disorders [2], and is in fact one of the diagnostic criteria for
some disorders (e.g., autism).
Functional neuroimaging techniques have shown that
social information processing involves networks of multiple
cortical brain regions, including areas associated with emotion
and reward, such as the anterior insula, orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC); the per-
ception and evaluation of social stimuli, including the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporal poles, superior temporal
sulcus (STS), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), paracingulate
cortex and precuneus; regulation of reactions to stimuli,
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and dorsal
ACC [2–4]. Disruption to these networks can result in
impairments in social cognition, producing similar symptoms
across different psychiatric disorders [5], although the neural
mechanisms underlying the symptoms may or may not differ
[2]. Thus, paradigms that measure these impairments across
different diagnoses in the spirit of the RDoC framework will
* Kristin K. Nicodemus
kristin.nicodemus@igmm.ed.ac.uk
1 Centre for Genomic and Experimental Medicine, Institute of
Genetics and Molecular Medicine, University of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, UK
2 Centre for Cognitive Ageing and Cognitive Epidemiology,















shed light on brain dysfunction across the spectrum of mental
ill health.
Game Theory paradigms allow social decision-making to be
studied experimentally by mimicking real-life social interactions
in controlled laboratory settings, providing an intermediate step
between social behaviour and the underlying neurobiological
mechanisms [6]. These paradigms involve dynamic interactions
between two or more players in strategic scenarios, and factors
influencing players’ decisions can be tested against predictions
from mathematical models of the mechanisms the games
represent. These games are widely used in behavioural and
psychiatric research because of their generalisability: they are
effective tools for assessing prosocial and antisocial actions in
healthy participants and can be used to evaluate abnormalities in
social behaviour in clinical groups. We will focus on a subgroup
of these Game Theory paradigms called neuroeconomic games,
which combine economics, psychology and neuroscience into a
general theory of human behaviour [7]. We will first describe
each game and then outline behavioural and neuroimaging
findings in clinical psychiatric populations.
Neuroeconomic games
Ultimatum Game
One of the simplest games, the Ultimatum Game [8] (Fig. 1a)
evaluates players’ reactions to the fairness of offers of a share
of money. In this game, the “Proposer” is endowed with a sum
of money which they split between themselves and the
“Responder”, choosing what proportion of the money to offer
them. The Responder then decides whether to accept or reject
the offer. If accepted, both players earn the amounts proposed,
but if rejected, neither player earns anything. To maximise
reward, the Proposer should offer the smallest possible share of
the stack and the Responder should accept any offer larger than
zero. However, Proposers tend to make “fair” offers of 30–
50% of the stack [9], regardless of the stack size [10]. Fair
offers are generally accepted, whereas unfair offers of less than
about 30% tend to be rejected [9, 11]. When played in repeated
rounds with the same partner (multi-shot format), the
Responder’s acceptance rate typically influences the Proposer’s
Fig. 1 Schematic of the main neuroeconomic games. a Ultimatum Game, b Trust Game, c Prisoner’s Dilemma and d Public Goods Game
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offers [5], so decisions are based on experience as well as the
current situation.
Meta-analyses of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies have shown that when receiving unfair offers,
brain areas related to emotion (insula, amygdala), cognition
(PFC, ACC), reward processing (ventromedial PFC (vmPFC),
striatum, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and putamen) and
action planning (supplementary motor area (SMA)) show
increases in the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)
response [11, 12]. These regions may form a reflexive emo-
tional system (anterior insula and vmPFC) that is motivated to
punish norm violations, and a deliberate system (ventrolateral
PFC, dorsomedial PFC, dlPFC and rACC) that overrides the
negative emotional response and suppresses self-interest to
allow rejection of offers [12]. Receiving fair offers activates
reward (vmPFC), emotion (posterior insula), visual (infer-
otemporal gyrus (ITG)), self-referential (precuneus) and
empathetic (PCC) processing regions [12]. In Proposers mak-
ing fair offers, both selfish and altruistic motives are evident
from increased BOLD in areas related to reward (striatum and
OFC), suggesting that they are thinking about their earnings,
and areas related to ToM and morals (PFC, posterior parietal
cortex (PCC)), showing that they are thinking about how the
other player will feel [13]. When making unfair offers, there is
an increase in the electroencephalography (EEG) medial frontal
negativity response [14], which reflects an emotional reaction
to violation of a social norm. This response indicates that
participants have an aversive reaction to inequality despite its
personal benefit.
Dictator Game
The Dictator Game [15] is similar to the Ultimatum Game,
except that the Responder has no choice but to accept the
Proposer’s offer, regardless of the value, so it measures pure
altruism from the Proposer. Offers tend to be lower than in
the Ultimatum Game (around 20%), but depend on the
context, e.g., knowledge of the characteristics of the
Responder or the possibility of punishment for making
unfair offers [9]. Making altruistic fair offers in this game is
associated with moral decision-making and effort to over-
come cognitive conflict, which have been associated with
activity in the ACC, PCC, right supramarginal gyrus and
right medial frontal gyrus [13, 16].
Trust Game
Another well-established neuroeconomic game is the Trust
Game [17], which measures both trust and trustworthiness or
reciprocity (Fig. 1b). In this game, the “Investor” is endowed
with a sum of money and can decide to send all, some or none
of their endowment to the “Trustee.” Every unit is multiplied
(usually by three) by the experimenter before reaching the
Trustee, who decides whether to return all, some or none of the
amount received to the Investor. The Investor could earn more
by investing, but they risk losing out if the Trustee “defects”
and keeps the money, rather than “reciprocating” and returning
part of the multiplied investment. To maximise income, the
Investor should not share any of their endowment and the
Trustee should not return any of what they are given. However,
almost all Investors send some money, generally around 50%
of their endowment, and Trustees return approximately the
amount the Investor sent to them [5, 9, 17, 18].
A review of the neuroscience underpinning the Trust
Game proposed that different brain areas are involved at
different phases: a cortical and subcortical network is
implicated in decisions about trustworthiness; frontal areas
are involved in deciding what to send/return; discovering
the outcome activates reward circuitry, evaluation
mechanisms and emotion-processing regions [19]. A meta-
analysis of fMRI studies [20] reported that the anterior
insula is active during decisions of whether to trust in
single-shot games, suggesting an aversion to uncertainty.
The ventral striatum response increases during multi-shot
games, perhaps reflecting generation of predictions about
outcomes and representations of the partner’s reputation. In
Trustees, the decision of whether to reciprocate involves the
anterior insula and intraparietal sulcus (IPS), indicating
evaluation of options. During feedback about the Trustee’s
response, increased activity has been observed in Investors’
dorsal striatum, suggesting reinforcement learning.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma [21], individuals’ self-interest
conflicts with that of the partnership, so it measures coop-
eration. Both players receive the same amount of money
and simultaneously decide whether to cooperate (share) or
defect (keep the money) (Fig. 1c). The total payoff is the
greatest and is equally split if both cooperate; if both defect,
the payoff is the lowest and equal, but a participant can earn
the most if they defect and their partner cooperates. The
optimal strategy is to always defect, but players cooperate
around half of the time [18, 22], or more if communication
is permitted [9]. Brain activity during this task occurs in
areas involved in ToM (anterior paracingulate cortex and
posterior STS), in encoding biographical memories (mid
STS and hippocampus) and in emotional arousal (posterior
cingulate and hypothalamus) [23].
Public Goods Game
The Public Goods Game is similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
but is played in larger groups and it has a public and a per-
sonal pot. Earnings in the private pot are as specified, but
earnings in the public pot are doubled and split between the
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participants (Fig. 1d). Again, earnings are maximised if all
players cooperate, but a player will earn the most if they
defect when all the others cooperate. The optimal strategy is
to contribute nothing to the public pot, but people generally
contribute around half to the public pot in one-shot games
[22]. Cooperation declines over time unless there is a possi-
bility for communication or punishment [5, 9].
Aims
Since neuroeconomic games can provide an ecologically
valid measure of social decision-making behaviour and its
underlying brain activity, they might be used as a tool
within the RDoC framework to assess abnormal function.
Previous reviews of neuroeconomic gameplay in psychiatric
disorders mostly describe individual disorders. This review
therefore aims to summarise behavioural and neuroimaging
findings from neuroeconomic gameplay studies of adults
with Axis 1 psychiatric disorders, and to interpret the
findings in the context of RDoC domains.
Methods
The search for publications was conducted through the
Medline (Pubmed), Web of Science and Scopus databases
in September 2017. The search terms were (neuroeco-
nomic* OR neuroeconomic* OR “economic game*” OR
“trust game*” OR “ultimatum game*” OR “prisoner’s
dilemma”) AND (psychiatr* OR psychotic OR psychosis
OR psychopath* OR “mood disorder*” OR depressi* OR
anxi* OR bipolar OR schizophren* OR schizotyp* OR
“mental disorder*”). The date of the search was restricted
to 1960 onwards. Only articles written in English were




The search returned 762 records (Fig. 2): 222 from Pubmed,
216 from Scopus and 324 from Web of Science. After
removal of duplicates, there were 463 records. These were
assessed for relevance based on their title and a total of 82
were taken forward for review of the abstract or a brief look
at the full text. Of these, 72 were considered to be relevant
and the full text was reviewed. Eight additional records
were included after identification through citations in arti-
cles returned by the search.
Depression
This review will recap the main findings and add results of
recent neuroeconomic studies of depression, as they have
previously been reviewed [4, 24].
Ultimatum Game
When acting as the Proposer in the Ultimatum Game,
patients with depressive disorders make more fair offers
than controls [25] or say that they would offer more [26].
As the Responder, patients with depression reject more
unfair offers than controls [26–28], as do healthy volunteers
after induction of sad mood [29]. Rejection rate correlates
with depressive symptom severity [26, 28] and does not
change even after symptoms improve with therapy [26],
implying that altered decision-making is a trait that man-
ifests in patients with more severe depression and persists
even after remission. Supporting the idea that increased
rejection is mainly evident in more severe cases, studies
reporting no difference between groups’ rejection rate of
unfair offers [25, 30–32] or greater acceptance of unfair
offers in depression [33] either involved nonclinical sam-
ples [31, 33] or patients with moderate depression [30, 32],
and one used a paradigm in which the participant played
both roles and so was motivated to accept offers in the hope
that their subsequent offers would be accepted [25]. In a
nonclinical sample, rejection rate for fair offers was not
affected by depression [33]; however, in a clinical sample,
rejection of both fair and hyperfair offers was greater in
patients than controls [27], so depression seems to be
associated with a general tendency to reject offers. Differ-
ences in patients’ performance on the Ultimatum Game may
be due to several factors: avoidance of being rejected
causing them to make higher offers [25]; reduced reward
Fig. 2 Summary of the search strategy and results
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sensitivity causing greater rejection of offers [27]; pessi-
mism and self-blame resulting in a focus on the negative
associations of unfair offers rather than the potential benefit
of accepting the offers [29, 32].
People with depression report more negative emotions
than controls on receiving unfair offers, including guilt,
disgust, surprise and anger [32, 33] as well as less happiness
about fair offers [30]. They also find offers more unfair [27],
although one study showed no difference in groups’ ratings
of fairness [26]. The understanding of fairness is not
affected since patients accept more fair than unfair offers
[25] and the smallest share they regard as acceptable does
not differ from controls [26]. Other decision-making pro-
cesses are also intact: patients and controls react similarly to
the Proposer’s emotion and to offers chosen over alterative
available offers [27]. Interestingly, controls accept more
very unfair offers of a small stake proposed by a computer
rather than a human, but patients do not, suggesting that
patients are only concerned with fairness and not with the
social context of the offer [28].
In an fMRI study, although no differences in behavioural
performance were observed, controls showed BOLD
responses in the vmPFC, nucleus accumbens and dorsal
caudate with increasing fairness, while patients only
showed vmPFC activity [30]. The nucleus accumbens and
dorsal caudate are part of the ventral and dorsal striatum,
respectively, and the absence of response in these areas in
patients may reflect abnormal processing of social fairness
and reward. With increasing unfairness, both groups acti-
vated the dorsal ACC and insula, but only controls activated
bilateral medial occipital cortex, which the authors propose
reflects attentional disengagement from aversive social cues
in patients. The BOLD responses to fairness in the nucleus
accumbens and to unfairness in the left medial occipital
region correlated negatively with anhedonia and symptom
severity, suggesting that these blunted neural responses may
contribute to patients’ negative experience of social
interactions.
Trust Game
One study has reported no association between depression
and performance as the Investor in the Trust Game, but
levels of depression in the cohort were very low [31]. As the
Responder in multi-shot Trust Games, patients with remit-
ted major depressive disorder (MDD) show more recipro-
city than healthy controls [34]. Another study found that
depressed men showed more reciprocity than healthy men,
but there was no difference for women; and suicidal idea-
tion reduced self-centredness in men and increased it in
women; so severe depression may reverse the typical profile
whereby women are more prosocial than men [35]. The
authors propose that behaving in a reciprocal way might
help to reduce social stress. In Trust Games with a high risk
of being caught “cheating” (returning less than the amount
requested by the Investor), patients with MDD cheat less
than controls, perhaps because reduced cognitive and
affective processing limit the ability to deal with the cog-
nitive load in this situation [36]. When the risk of detection
is low, controls start to cheat but patients do not [37], and
this behaviour is predicted by reductions in the BOLD
response in the left dorsal putamen and anterior insula.
These areas are involved in implementing action based on
the risks and values of the situation, so that again they may
reflect a reduced ability to deal with socio-cognitive
demands of such situations [37]. If caught cheating, parti-
cipants’ earnings would be confiscated, so the increased
reciprocity and reduced cheating in patients with depression
may also be due to a desire to avoid punishment.
Prisoner’s Dilemma and other cooperative games
People with depression are less cooperative in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game than healthy controls [32, 38] and have a
more negative emotional reaction to betrayal: behaving
more aggressively towards a betraying partner and being
more critical of their own performance in another task after
being betrayed [39]. They also express feelings of self-
devaluation, which may reduce cooperation. Similarly, in
healthy participants, depressive symptoms are associated
with less cooperative behaviour on Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Public Goods Games [31] or a reduced intention to coop-
erate [40]. However, one study reports that depressive
symptoms in a nonclinical sample are associated with more
sustained cooperation with a cooperative partner in a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma and with more changeable responses to an
unbiased partner [41].
An fMRI study found no difference in behaviour of
patients with MDD and controls, but while both groups
showed BOLD responses in the anterior insula and dlPFC
when one player reciprocated and the other defected,
patients’ left dlPFC responses were reduced and this
reduction correlated with guilt at not reciprocating coop-
eration [42]. The reduced dlPFC response may reflect dif-
ficulties with the higher cognitive demand of regulating
emotions and making decisions during imbalanced social
interactions. Patients were less satisfied with their earnings
and reported more feelings of betrayal and guilt.
Summary: depression
Patients with depression have a more negative emotional
reaction to unpleasant social interactions than healthy con-
trols [30, 32, 39], and respond accordingly, e.g., rejecting
unfair Ultimatum offers [26–28] and disengaging attention
from the situation [30]. Although there is wider evidence for
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a negative emotional bias in depression, it is not clear
whether this is a state or trait effect [43], so longitudinal
studies of neuroeconomic gameplay could contribute to this
debate in the context of unequal social interactions. The
greater generosity [25] and reciprocity [34–37] observed in
depression may be a mechanism to reduce the risk of
negative social interactions, or may reflect guilt-based
hyper-altruism [44]; however, evidence for reduced coop-
eration [32, 38] does not support this theory, so further
research is required on the topic of prosocial decisions in
neuroeconomic games in depression. People with MDD
show a reduced ability to adapt their behaviour with chan-
ging circumstances in the games, indicating impaired inte-
gration of cognitive and affective information to inform
decision-making. There is also behavioural [26–28] and
neuroimaging [30] evidence for reduced reward sensitivity
in depression. These behaviours all fall under the Affiliation
and Attachment RDoC construct, which is part of the
Systems for Social Processes domain; and decision-making
and reward sensitivity fall under the Reward Valuation and
Responsiveness constructs within the Positive Valence
Systems domain, respectively. Some inconsistencies in the
results across studies may be due to the differences in
patient characteristics such as symptom severity and medi-
cation, and differences in the paradigms such as single-
versus multi-shot [24, 45].
Bipolar disorder
An Ultimatum Game study of patients in the euthymic
phase of bipolar disorder found greater rejection of offers
where fairness was ambiguous (around 30% of the stack)
compared with controls, but similar acceptance of clearly
fair and unfair offers [46]. Patients also made angry state-
ments about the game, but some expressed regret at
behaving impulsively and rejecting offers that lost them
profit. In the Trust Game, patients with remitted bipolar
disorder showed more reciprocity than controls, which is
dysfunctional as it reduces personal gain [34]. Patients with
bipolar disorder therefore behave similarly to people with
depression in neuroeconomic games: reacting angrily to
unfairness and showing increased reciprocity that could




Generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is associated with
avoidance of social confrontation. One study has reported
that patients with GAD accept more unfair Ultimatum
Game offers and rate these as less unequal than both
controls and patients with panic disorder [47]. Patients also
reported no difference in emotional responses to fair and
unfair offers, unlike controls. The authors propose that
avoidance of conflict and a lack of anger at unfair treatment
causes increased acceptance of unfair offers. Two studies
have investigated Ultimatum Game behaviour in students
with high- and low-trait anxiety (HTA/LTA) [48, 49]. As
the Proposer, the groups made similar offers that were
generally fair. As the Responder, when participants thought
that they were interacting with a human, acceptance of
unfair offers was negatively associated with self-esteem in
HTA participants, but positively associated with impulsivity
in LTA participants, perhaps reflecting avoidance of social
exclusion and a desire to maximise profit regardless of
fairness, respectively. The two studies found contradictory
results in relation to acceptance of unfair offers from
humans or computers in the two groups, indicating that the
interaction between fairness, social context and anxiety
requires further investigation. In parietal EEG electrodes,
the P3 component involved in evaluating events was larger
for human than computer proposers in the HTA but not the
LTA group, so highly anxious people might find unfair
offers from humans more salient than from computers,
whereas less anxious people are less concerned about the
social context [48]. The feedback-related negativity
response in frontal electrodes was larger for unequal than
equal offers in the HTA but not the LTA group, so highly
anxious people may evaluate unfair offers more negatively,
although this contradicts the self-reports of emotion in the
study described above [47]. These suggest that high-trait
anxiety is associated with similar avoidance of socially
stressful situations as is seen in GAD; however, further
studies are needed to show the relationship between clini-
cally diagnosed anxiety and HTA.
Trust Game
As the Investor in a Trust Game, patients with generalised
social anxiety disorder (GSAD) and controls are both more
likely to cooperate with a cooperative Trustee, so there was
no difference in behaviour between groups [50, 51]. How-
ever, there were differences in brain activity: in controls, a
network of regions involved in social decision-making was
active when playing a human as opposed to a computer
partner; in patients, this network was less extensive and did
not include the mPFC, an area involved in attributing
mental states to others and in forming impressions about
people [50]. Controls also engaged the ventral striatum
during repeated exchanges with cooperative as opposed to
neutral partners, while the GSAD group did not, and the
severity of social anxiety symptoms predicted diminished
responses to cooperative partners [51]. This finding could
reflect hyperarousal during social interactions or a deficit in
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implicit learning of partners’ reputations and how to use this
information for future decisions.
Prisoner’s Dilemma and other cooperative games
Cooperation may be more affected by other symptoms than
by anxiety itself: patients with GSAD gave less than con-
trols in a Prisoner’s Dilemma [52], but giving was more
strongly associated with quality of friendships and the
interpersonal traits of vindictiveness and coldness than by
the diagnosis [52, 53]. In students with attachment anxiety,
symptoms of anxiety and avoidance did not significantly
predict cooperation, but highly anxious patients were slower
to make decisions and less consistent in their performance
on the Assurance Game but not the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
indicating a chronic lack of trust, since the Assurance Game
is a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma that encourages
cooperation by giving the highest payoff when both players
cooperate. Priming patients with attachment security
reduced this difference and increased cooperation on the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, so trust in attachment anxiety can be
increased by security of the social interaction [54].
Two studies on adolescents with anxiety disorders
playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma report contradictory results:
one found that after their partner cooperated, patients
were more cooperative than controls, but there was no
difference after defection [55]; the other found that patients
were more cooperative after defection, despite feeling more
negative about their partner, but there was no difference
after cooperation [56]. The difference may be due to higher
comorbidity of depressive disorders in the original study.
Patients showed reduced BOLD activity compared with
controls in the mPFC and ACC when discovering the
partner’s response [56]. The reduced mPFC activity mirrors
that observed in Trust Games [51] and could reflect a lack
of engagement of prefrontal areas to monitor responses and
integrate the decision-making brain network. The reduced
ACC response may represent limited generation of expec-
tations about partners’ behaviour. Patients also showed a
greater BOLD response in the anterior precuneus and the
right TPJ than controls [56], which could represent heigh-
tened focus on their own behaviour and rumination about
what others are thinking, respectively.
Summary: anxiety
Patients with anxiety respond in the opposite way to those
with depression in the Ultimatum Game, accepting more
unfair offers and reacting less negatively to unfairness.
Social decision-making in anxiety is influenced by internal
factors such as personal characteristics, and by external
influences like cooperation and perceived security, and is
associated with abnormalities in prefrontal cortex activity.
Schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic
disorders
The use of neuroeconomic games in schizophrenia and
psychosis has been summarised in reviews focussed on
social functioning [57] and moral cognition [58] that were
published prior to several additional studies reviewed here.
Ultimatum and Dictator Games
As the Proposer in Ultimatum Games, patients with schi-
zophrenia offer a greater share of the stack than controls,
making more hyperfair and fair offers, and fewer unfair
offers [59–61]. Similarly, in a nonclinical sample, only
participants with high schizotypy scores made hyperfair
offers in Ultimatum and Dictator Games, and higher offers
were associated with greater positive (cognitive/perceptual
and disorganised) symptoms [62]. As the Responder,
patients with schizophrenia reject more offers than controls
[59], or reject more fair and hyperfair offers [63, 64] but
accept more unfair offers [63–65], as do students with
schizotypal traits [62]. One study found the opposite:
patients with schizophrenia rejected more unfair offers than
controls [66] and another found no behavioural difference
between patients and controls [61]. However, the bulk of
the evidence suggests that individuals with schizophrenia or
high levels of schizotypy behave less strategically on these
games, failing to maximise profit [57, 58]. The greater
acceptance of unfair offers may reflect reduced altruistic
punishment in schizophrenia (punishing unfair behaviour at
the expense of one’s own profit) [63], which may be due to
patients’ tendency to choose imminent rewards rather than
possible future gains [67]. The reason for increased rejec-
tion of fair and hyperfair offers could be impaired ToM,
causing patients to be less aware of the generous intentions
of the Proposer [64].
Acceptance of offers correlates with delusions and sus-
piciousness/persecution [63], and acceptance of unfair
offers correlates with excitement and disorganisation [65].
These correlations with positive symptoms may be driven
by patients being more apprehensive of the consequences of
rejecting offers [63], or by increased feelings of victimisa-
tion [65], potentially resulting in an expectation of unfair
treatment and so a less negative reaction to it. Rejection of
fair offers correlates with negative symptoms [65], which
we propose reflects low self-esteem, causing patients to
believe that they are not worth the equal share.
Patients with schizophrenia also respond less con-
sistently than controls, e.g., rejecting higher offers after
accepting lower ones [63], and show less behavioural
flexibility: failing to adapt to changes in the task or their
partner’s behaviour. As the Proposer, they do not reduce
their offer after acceptance of a previous offer [59], or offer
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lower amounts to a computer than a human partner [60] as
controls do. Controls were also more likely to reject an
unfair offer when the Proposer chose that over a fair alter-
native, whereas patients were not influenced by alternative
offers [64]. ToM partially mediated this group difference, so
patients may fail to see the alternative offer from the Pro-
poser’s perspective. Smoking normalised this difference:
patients who smoke showed similar reactions to alternative
offers as controls and nonsmoking patients’ performance
was improved by a 1mg dose of nicotine [68]. Patients are
not affected by the Proposer’s emotion, while controls reject
more unfair offers proposed with angry than other expres-
sions [66] and accept higher offers if the Proposer’s
expression was positive [63]. In a Dictator Game where
participants could punish the Investor’s unfairness by giv-
ing to the Responder and taking from the Investor, patients
showed similar likelihood and the amount of punishment to
controls, suggesting that patients do not have the difficulty
in recognising unfairness, and the degree of punishment was
associated with depressive and negative symptoms [65],
supporting findings from studies of depression that show a
negative emotional reaction to unfairness.
In an EEG study, no difference was observed between
patients with schizophrenia and controls playing the Pro-
poser, but the amplitude of feedback-related negativity
(FRN) in the dlPFC and mPFC was reduced in patients
playing the Responder, which may reflect difficulty in
interpreting others’ behaviours [61]. When anticipating the
Responder’s decision, alpha oscillations in the frontal and
temporoparietal regions measured using EEG correlate with
the risk of rejection by human partners in controls, but by
computer partners in patients with schizophrenia [60]. This
activity correlated with positive symptoms and may reflect a
lack of mentalising ability in patients, or a misattribution of
salience to computer partners.
Trust Game
Several studies by the same research group have found that
patients with early and chronic psychosis and their first-
degree relatives have lower initial levels of trust than con-
trols when playing the Investor in Trust Games [69–71],
suggesting a potential genetic underpinning to the strategies
employed, though one study found no difference in sib-
lings’ cooperative behaviour [72]. Reduced trust correlated
with negative symptoms in patients with early-stage psy-
chosis, so that it could reflect a lack of social motivation
[70]. Over time, these patients begin to trust cooperative
partners, reaching similar levels of cooperation to controls,
but their trust in deceptive partners did not drop as much as
controls’, suggesting a limited reaction to violations of trust
or reduced behavioural flexibility after negative feedback
[70]. Patients with chronic psychosis invested less overall in
a cooperative partner than controls, but groups did not differ
when playing a deceptive partner [71]. When given prior
information of a Trustee’s trustworthiness, controls and
first-degree relatives increased their trust, but patients with
chronic psychosis did not [69], again indicating less stra-
tegic decision-making and reduced behavioural flexibility.
Patients with chronic psychosis show a smaller BOLD
response than controls in the right TPJ when the Trustee
responds, and a smaller signal in the right caudate nucleus
during cooperative responses, which may indicate that
patients find positive interactions less rewarding [71]. The
reduced caudate signal also correlated negatively with
patients’ paranoia scores [71]. Siblings of patients with
psychosis also showed reduced activation of the right cau-
date and putamen during investments, and of the left insula
during repayments [72], indicating that the aberrant func-
tioning in reward-processing regions observed in psychosis
may have biological origins that are shared in siblings.
Prisoner’s Dilemma and other cooperative games
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma where money could be lost as well
as won, controls behaved less cooperatively, showing loss
aversion. Patients with schizophrenia did not show this
effect, but those with less severe symptoms behaved more
like controls [73]. Patients were also more cooperative on a
Public Goods Game than controls, but again showed less of
an impact of changes in the game: only controls defected
less when cooperation was enforced and the risk of losing
money was removed, and controls were influenced by
failure to earn a bonus on the preceding trial, while patients
were not, suggesting that patients do not recognise the
impact of the previous trial on subsequent trials [74]. The
increased cooperation in patients comes at the expense of
personal profit and may be due to reduced loss aversion,
impaired ToM and poor integration of cognitive and
affective information [74].
Summary: schizophrenia and psychotic disorders
In general, patients with schizophrenia and psychotic dis-
orders behave less “strategically”, making higher offers in
Ultimatum and Dictator Games [59–61], accepting more
unfair offers [63–65] and rejecting more fair and hyperfair
offers [63, 64]. They also show less trust [69–71] but
more cooperation [73, 74] than controls, and are less flex-
ible: failing to adapt to the availability of contextual infor-
mation or to their partner’s emotion or performance
[59, 60, 63, 64, 66, 69, 74]. Several reasons for these
behaviours have been proposed, including risk avoidance,
limited loss aversion, preference for short-term gain, feel-
ings of victimisation, poor ToM, reduced social motivation
and poor integration of cognitive and affective information.
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Behavioural performance and brain activity correlate with
positive, negative and overall symptom severity, so social
decisions are more affected in patients who are more
unwell. It would be helpful for further gameplay studies to
investigate early, chronic and relatives of people with
schizophrenia/psychosis using the same tasks and ideally
also to examine genetic markers of behaviour on the games.
Autism spectrum disorders
One study has reported that children with ASD accept
more unfair initial Ultimatum Game offers and reject more
fair offers, perhaps because they do not recognise the
other’s unfair or generous intent [75]. Interestingly, several
studies have shown no abnormalities in neuroeconomic
gameplay behaviour in people with ASD: performance was
similar to controls when acting as the Proposer in the
Ultimatum and Dictator Games [75], and in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [75–77], Trust Game [78] and Beauty Contest
Game (where individuals must guess what others are
thinking) [79]. However, there is some evidence that
symptoms of ASD relate to performance on these games,
again supporting the use of RDoC criteria to describe
psychiatric disorders in terms of observable behaviours
rather than diagnoses. Participants who failed ToM or
mentalising tasks showed less cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [75, 76] and behaved less strategically: failing to
exploit cooperation and reciprocate defection in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma and making lower Ultimatum proposals
[75]. Similarly, adults with more severe symptoms of ASD
were more likely to follow a fixed strategy, whereas con-
trols were more likely to consider their partner’s move and
use ToM to guide their decisions in a Stag Hunt Game,
which measures cooperation [80]. Patients with ASD have
a severely diminished middle cingulate response compared
with controls playing the Trustee in a Trust Game, which
may represent a reduced representation of the social intent
of their actions and could lead to a reduced ability to model
the intentions of others [78]. Children with ASD also
showed reduced BOLD responses in the left insula, TPJ
and bilateral caudate during defection of a human partner
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and less activity than controls in
the right insula during defection of a computer partner
[77], suggesting reduced engagement of a social salience
network. Overall, patients with ASD do not behave dif-
ferently to controls on neuroeconomic games, but reduced
ToM and mentalising ability is associated with reduced
cooperation and strategic performance, and patients show
decreased recruitment of brain regions involved in social
processing during the interactions. However, it should be
noted that in two of these studies [75, 77], groups were not
matched for intelligence, so future studies should clarify
the contributions of ToM, mentalising and intelligence on




Children and adolescents with ADHD did not differ from
controls in offers made as the Proposer in the Ultimatum
Game, but patients made fewer fair offers in a Dictator Game
[81]. Self-reports confirmed that the ADHD groups were able
to take another’s perspective and show empathic concern, but
they chose to make decisions based on strategy rather than
fairness. A discussion article proposed that three networks are
involved in neuroeconomic decisions in ADHD: the default
mode network linking medial, prefrontal and posterior cin-
gulate cortex, which alters understanding of utility, anticipa-
tion of outcomes, setting of goals and implementing aims; a
dorsal frontostriatal network that affects executive function
and decision-making; dopaminergic dysregulation of a ventral
frontostriatal network that disrupts evaluation of future utility,
feedback on outcomes and learning of associations between
cues and outcomes [82].
Eating disorders
Women with and recovering from anorexia showed less
reciprocity than controls as the Trustee in a Trust Game, and
had a diminished precuneus and right angular gyrus BOLD
responses to high offers by the Proposer compared with
controls [83]. The degree to which they attribute positive
experiences to other people was inversely correlated with
activity in a social network, including the precuneus, so
patients may have difficulty in recognising kindness.
Responses to low offers were lower in the left fusiform area
only in currently ill participants, so recovery might be
linked to recognising malevolence.
Post-traumatic stress disorder
In a Trust Game and a non-social task with a similar
format, women with assault-related PTSD were slower to
learn the probability of success for decisions, and errors
were less likely to affect their future decisions, sug-
gesting that they are less flexible in using their experi-
ences to guide future decision-making [84]. Patients
were less trusting than controls after Trustees behaved
uncooperatively and were less likely to return to initial
levels of trust. Abnormal activity in patients’ TPJ during
social prediction errors may represent overthinking of
others’ intentions.
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Discussion
Neuroeconomic games within the RDoC framework
Neuroeconomic games provide a “snapshot” of social
functioning that is more ecologically valid than current
diagnostic measures, such as interviews or self-report
questionnaires. This type of measure aligns with the
recent move towards using the RDoC framework to
describe mental health in terms of behaviours and functions
rather than diagnoses [1], an approach which is gathering
momentum and potentially merits wider adoption. All
neuroeconomic games measure social processing that falls
under the Affiliation and Attachment construct in the Sys-
tems for Social Processes RDoC domain; and reward pro-
cessing, which is reflected in the Positive Valence Systems
domain. Table 1 shows the RDoC constructs that neuroe-
conomic games apply to, and through which dysfunctional
social decision-making could be measured. The specific
game to use will depend on behaviour of interest: e.g.,
fairness, trust, reciprocity and cooperation.
Synthesis of the literature review
Performance in neuroeconomic games differs between
individuals with psychiatric disorders and healthy controls
in several ways, with some similarities and some differences
between diagnoses. Table 2 summarises the main results
reviewed here and shows which RDoC construct each
observed dysfunction applies to. There are two areas in
which there is consistency across diagnoses: (1) impaired
ToM and integration of social and cognitive processes,
which result in less effective and flexible decision-making.
These impairments fall under the Affiliation and Attach-
ment, Reward Valuation and Reward Learning RDoC
constructs. Examples of these behaviours include a reduced
ability to process social information, react to changes in the
task or make strategic decisions to optimise outcomes in
schizophrenia, PTSD and ASD.
(2) Increased risk avoidance (of negative social interac-
tions) and reduced reward sensitivity, which result in
reduced profit-seeking. These behaviours are associated
with the Affiliation and Attachment, Reward Valuation and
Reward Responsivity RDoC constructs. Examples of
avoidance of the risk of negative social interactions include
increased generosity in depression and schizophrenia; tol-
erance of unfairness in anxiety, schizophrenia and ASD;
reciprocity in depression and bipolar disorder. Examples of
reduced reward sensitivity include rejection of possible
reward in depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and
ASD and a reduced striatal response in depression.
There are two areas that show different effects across
diagnoses, both of which fall under the Affiliation and
Attachment RDoC construct: (1) the emotional reaction to
negative interactions is more negative in MDD and bipolar
disorder, but less negative in anxiety, and (2) there is mixed
evidence for cooperative and altruistic behaviour. There are
reduced levels of cooperation in depression: trust in schi-
zophrenia and PTSD; altruism in ADHD; reciprocity in
anorexia. However, there are increased levels of generosity
in depression and schizophrenia; reciprocity in depression
and bipolar disorder; cooperation in schizophrenia.
There has not been sufficient neuroimaging research to
discriminate which brain regions are dysfunctional during
all of the behaviours observed in neuroeconomic games;
however, several regions involved in social, emotional and
cognitive processing show differences between patients and
controls, including the precuneus, caudate, cingulate cortex,
insula, TPJ, mPFC and dlPFC. Most of these regions show
reduced activity in patients, so they may reflect decreased
sensitivity to the information required to play the games, or
reduced communication and integration of information
across social decision-making networks. Several studies
have also reported differences in neural responses but no
difference in behavioural performance, so patients could
have underlying biological deficits that are obscured by
compensatory behavioural strategies.
Caveats
If neuroeconomic games are to be used in identifying def-
icits in social function in mental ill health, it will be
necessary to ensure that more consistent procedures are
followed: parameters such as the proportions of the stack
available, knowledge about the identity or habits of the
opponents, inclusion of a computer partner “control” con-
dition and opportunities for cheating or punishing should be
standardised in order to create a profile of the expected
Table 1 RDoC domains and constructs that are involved in neuroeconomic gameplay
Domain Construct Process involved
Positive Valence Systems Reward Responsiveness (RR) Responses to possible, received and repeated reward
Reward Learning (RL) Predicting a positive outcome, modifying behaviour based on outcome
Reward Valuation (RV) Computing the probability and benefits of an outcome
Systems for Social Processes Affiliation and Attachment (AA) Processing social cues, social learning and forming relationships
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Table 2 Summary of the results of neuroeconomic gameplay studies in Axis 1 psychiatric disorders, the dysfunction implicated by the results and
the RDoC construct associated with the dysfunction
Disorder Game Result Dysfunction implicated RDoC
MDD Ultimatum/Dictator Make more fair offers [25] Avoidance of risk (of rejection) AA/RV
Hyper-altruism AA
Reject more offers especially unfair [26–28] Aversion to negative interaction AA
Reduced reward sensitivity RR
React negatively to unfairness [30, 32] Aversion to negative interaction AA
No change with computer vs. human [28] Poor social/cognitive integration AA/RV
No BOLD in nucleus accumbens and dorsal caudate
for fairer offers [30]
Decreased processing of fairness AA
Reduced reward sensitivity RR
Less occipital BOLD for unfair offers [30] Attentional disengagement AA
Trust More reciprocity [34, 35] Avoidance of risk (of social stress) AA/RV
Hyper-altruism AA
Less cheating in low-risk situation [36, 37] Poor social/cognitive integration AA/RV
Less BOLD in dorsal putamen, AI and DLPFC
during low-risk cheating [37]
Poor social/cognitive integration AA/RV
Prisoner’s Dilemma/
Public Goods
Less cooperation [32, 38] Reduced altruism AA
More negative about betrayal [39] Aversion to negative interaction AA
Bipolar disorder Ultimatum/Dictator Reject more moderately unfair offers [46] Aversion to negative interaction AA
Reduced reward sensitivity RR
React negatively to the game [46] Aversion to negative interaction AA
Trust More reciprocity [34] Hyper-altruism AA
Prisoner’s/Public Goods
Anxiety Ultimatum/Dictator Accept more unfair offers [47] Avoid conflict AA
Report unfair offers as less unequal [47] Less angry about negative interaction AA
Trust No difference in reciprocity [50, 51]
Reduced BOLD in mPFC with human vs. computer
partner [50]
Poor ToM and impression formation AA
Reduced BOLD in ventral striatum with cooperative
vs. neutral partner [51]
Poor social/cognitive integration AA/RV
Prisoner’s Dilemma/
Public Goods
Inconsistent results [52, 55, 56]
Reduced BOLD in ACC and mPFC to partner’s
response [56]
Poor social/cognitive integration AA/RV
Increased BOLD in precuneus and TPJ to partner’s
response [56]
Heightened self-focus and rumination on
others’ behaviour
AA
Schizophrenia/psychosis Ultimatum/Dictator Make more fair or hyperfair and fewer unfair offers
[59–61]
Avoidance of risk (rejection) AA/RV
Hyper-altruism AA
Accept more unfair [63–65], reject more fair and
hyperfair [63, 64], but inconsistent results [61, 66]
Reduced altruistic punishment, poor ToM,
victimisation and impulsivity
AA
No change in altered situation [59, 60, 63, 64, 66] Less flexibility, poor strategising RL
Reduced FRN in dlPFC and mPFC [61] Poor ToM AA
Frontal and TPJ alpha when playing computer vs.
human [60]
Poor mentalising, misattribution of salience
to a computer
AA
Trust Game Less trust [69–71] Low social motivation AA
No change in altered situation [69] Less flexibility, poor strategising RL
Reduced BOLD in right TPJ and right caudate [71]
during partner’s response
Reduced reward sensitivity RR
Prisoner’s Dilemma/
Public Goods
More cooperation [73, 74] Lack of loss aversion, poor ToM and poor
social/cognitive integration
AA/RV
No change in altered situation [74] Less flexibility, poor strategising RL
ASD Ultimatum/Dictator Accept more unfair, reject more fair [75] Poor ToM AA
Trust No group difference [78]
Less BOLD in middle cingulate [78] Reduced processing of social intent AA
Prisoner’s Dilemma/
Public Goods
No group difference [75–77]
Less BOLD in insula, TPJ and caudate [77] Reduced social processing AA
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results in healthy controls, so deviations from these can be
readily identified and attributed to a deficit in a particular
function or neural circuit. Indeed, the sometimes-conflicting
results reported here may be attributed to these differences
as well as to moderate sample sizes, focus on clinical
populations with varying degrees of severity and inclusion
of nonclinical populations [24]. Neuroeconomic games are
relatively complex tasks and there is evidence that memory
and other cognitive functions might affect decision-making
[67] and that social cognitive impairment overlaps with
general cognitive impairment [69], so group comparisons
should take into account intelligence and memory
performance.
Further directions
In addition to potentially being incorporated into the RDoC
framework, future prospects for use of neuroeconomic
games in psychiatric disorders could include use in neu-
roimaging studies of structural and functional connectivity
of brain networks involved in social processing. Identifi-
cation of abnormalities in this way could potentially lead to
the ability to stratify patients into diagnosis-spanning
subgroups.
Investigation of genetic factors associated with sub-
optimal performance on the games could lead to the
identification of molecular processes that could elucidate
molecular mechanisms and potentially druggable targets.
There is some evidence that behaviour in neuroeconomic
games is heritable, suggesting a genetic component to
social decision-making. In the Trust Game, trust from the
Investor shows heritability of 20% in a Swedish sample
and 10% in an American sample, and trustworthiness of
the Responder shows heritability of 18 and 17% in the two
groups [85]. In the Ultimatum Game, over 40% of var-
iation in rejection behaviour is explained by additive
genetic effects [86]. In addition, studies in first-degree
relatives have also shown a genetic component, which
suggests that neuroeconomic gameplay may be useful as
an observable behavioural endophenotype for genetic
studies of psychiatric disorders [69–71]. Studies of the
molecular genetics underlying neuroeconomic gameplay
strategies have thus far been limited to candidate genes.
More altruistic behaviour during the Dictator Game was
observed in individuals carrying the RS3 long promoter
region repeat of arginine vasopressin 1a (AVPR1A) versus
those carrying the shorter repeat [87]. AVPR1A has long
been known to be critical for social cognition and beha-
viour in both lower mammals and humans [88]. A variable
number of tandem repeat (VNTR) functional poly-
morphism in the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene has
been associated with fairness in the Ultimatum Game
Responder role in a Chinese sample, where individuals
with the 4/4 genotype (versus 2 allele carriers) required a
greater threshold for the minimal acceptable offer, but
there was no effect on the Proposer [89]. The effect of this
polymorphism on the Responder and the absence of an
effect on the Proposer have been replicated in an inde-
pendent sample of individuals from Germany [90]. In
addition, the German study reported an association
between a haplotype block containing two single
nucleotides in the dopamine receptor D2 gene (DRD2) and
the behaviour of the Proposer, where individuals carrying
at least one T–T haplotype at rs1800497 and rs2283265
proposed significantly lower amounts than those not car-
rying this haplotype [90]. DRD2 has long been a candi-
date gene for schizophrenia and other psychiatric
disorders and was recently implicated in the list of
genome-wide significant loci in the Psychiatric Genomics
Consortium meta-analysis of schizophrenia genome-wide
studies [91]. However, genomic studies on neuroeco-
nomic gameplay are still in their infancy, with no current
genome-wide study results available, and the candidate
gene studies conducted suffered from small sample sizes
required to detect the modest effects of most genomic
variation. Further research is needed to determine whether
genes or biological pathways associated with different
aspects of social dysfunctional decision-making can be
identified and therefore targeted for the development of
treatments.
A few studies have assessed performance on neuroeco-
nomic games before and after an intervention. Depletion of
serotonin, which is implicated in social behaviour, increases
rejection of unfair Ultimatum Game offers in healthy con-
trols [92] and reduces acceptance of unfair offers in patients
with GAD [47], so serotonin may modulate individuals’
perceived fairness of a situation. Oxytocin is involved in
prosocial behaviour, but there is no clear impact of oxytocin
administration on healthy controls playing the Trust Game
[93]. Finally, disrupting neuronal activity in the right dlPFC
using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation reduced
rejection of unfair offers in an Ultimatum Game [94] and
made people more likely to defect on a Trust Game, sug-
gesting that this region is involved in overriding selfish
interests and the ability to maintain a positive reputation
[95]. The fact that behaviour can be altered by these inter-
ventions suggests the possibility of identifying molecular or
neural mechanisms that could be used therapeutically, but
again, more work is required to determine exactly which
aspects of behaviour could be targeted.
Neuroeconomic games could therefore be used in future
to stratify patients into diagnosis-spanning subgroups based
on their social decision-making ability, or to identify targets
for behavioural, pharmacological or genetic interventions to
alleviate the impact of dysfunctional social decision-making
in psychiatric disorders.
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